In recent years the West has dispatched "rule doctors" across the developing world to guide poor countries through the process of legal modernization and westernization. Their goal, laid out by the so-called Washington Consensus, has been to reform those countries' legal systems so that they might share in the economic bounty of globalization. But things have not always gone well, particularly -this paper argues -where those rule doctors have ignored existing legal traditions. The paper focuses on the particular case of Niger, one of the poorest countries in the world. At present, most of Niger's citizens rely on magio-religious traditions to accomplish what we in the West would consider law. One important, and from a Western perspective colorful, Nigerien legal tradition is its citizens' reliance on an oracle called the gon to identify wrongdoers and restore harmony to their communities. The paper will describe the gon, and will point out some of the ways that it differs fundamentally from Western conceptions of law. It then will conclude that Washington Consensus law reform in Niger will fail, and will very likely cause social unrest, unless it takes a different tack and finds a way to accommodate existing legal traditions.
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades the West 1 has imposed on the Developing World the so-called Washington Consensus (Consensus), a package of policy reforms that, if implemented properly, is supposed to propel poor countries toward First World prosperity. 2 In the United States, popular accounts of the Consensus focus on its economic policies and their social consequences. The usual story is that Western countries and the financial institutions they control-most notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-insist that a given poor country implement policies of privatization and trade liberalization. The poor country's government, having little choice in the matter, begins to comply with these "structural adjustment" initiatives, which leads to protests and general social unrest when the citizenry realizes, among other things, that the price of bread has doubled overnight. 3 But there is another important aspect of Consensus reform that is rarely discussed in the Western popular press-one that has the potential to create at least as much social unrest as economic policies: legal reform. The Washington Legal Consensus 4 maintains that poor countries must reshape their legal systems to make them compatible with Western conceptions of law and justice. If they do not, they will fail to attract trade and investment, and will be left out of the longterm prosperity made possible by the Consensus economic reforms. 5 Scholars who have scrutinized the Washington Legal Consensus have found much to criticize. 6 Some abhor that Consensus reformers impose new laws and legal concepts after only minimal consultation with the affected populations. 7 Others find it troubling that educated elites within poor countries tend to use Consensus legal reforms to consolidate their economic and political power. 8 Many observe that the anticipated economic benefits of legal reform rarely materialize. 9 Few scholars, however, have offered a detailed look at how the Washington Legal Consensus actually plays out on the ground in developing countries and how it affects the lives of ordinary people living there.
This Article will attempt to fill that gap by examining the particular case of Niger, an especially poor and isolated country that is in the midst of Consensusinspired law reform. It will describe the law that most contemporary Nigeriens rely on to resolve their day-to-day disputes, concluding that Consensus-mandated legal reforms grounded in liberal Western conceptions of law and justice are so fundamentally different from the law and justice that Nigerien people live by dayto-day that the attempt at abrupt reform will cause significant social dislocation.
A. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
On the theory that most readers are unfamiliar with traditional Nigerien law, this Article will begin in Part II with a descriptive example, leaving an analysis of that law for later. Part III will provide a summary description of the Washington Legal Consensus and its application in Niger. Part IV will furnish the reader with the necessary background on Niger, including a general description of its law 8. See Paul H. Brietzke, The Politics of Legal Reform, WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2004) (arguing that elites tend to gain power and influence during the process of structural adjustment and legal reform); see also Klug, supra note 6, at 280.
9. Brietzke, supra note 8, at 17; see Zafar, supra note 2, at 8-10, 20.
from the opposite perspectives of Niger's government and its ordinary citizens. Because the law that most Nigeriens live by is inexorably connected with their history and religion, those topics will also be discussed. In Part V, this Article will turn towards legal ethnography, illustrating concrete examples of the magicinfused, spiritually influenced, traditional law that the majority of Niger's people live by, as well as highlighting some of the fundamental differences between this law and that which the Washington Legal Consensus seeks to impose. Part VI concludes the Article by positing that trouble is in store for Niger if it continues to follow its current Consensus-mandated path and suggests some alternative approaches that could facilitate the development of Niger's legal system without throwing the country into turmoil.
II. ILLUSTRATION OF NIGERIEN TRADITIONAL LAW: THE GON ORACLE IDENTIFIES A THEIF
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It is midmorning in the Zongo 11 neighborhood of Niger's capital, Niamey. A crowd of agitated people gathers at the ancestral home of the Sarkin of Zongo, 12 the traditional chief whose clan has reigned over this area of town since the early 20 th century. 13 The people, perhaps twenty of them, are squeezed into a narrow dirt walkway between two mud buildings and are arguing about thefts.
14 A man-well-educated and prosperous by Nigerien standards-is at the center of the throng. 15 He tells the Sarkin that he is sure that one of his two wives, both of whom are present, has been stealing from him. 16 In the recent past, money, valuable clothing, and expensive prayer rugs have disappeared from his home. 17 He has brought his wives to the Sarkin in order to perform the gon, an oracle that will reveal which one is guilty. 18 10. All of the events described in this vignette are based on Zongo Field Notes 00001, in Niamey, Niger (Feb. 18, 2004) . For a description of the methodology I employed in studying traditional Nigerien law, see infra Part V.A.
11. Zongo is a word of Hausa origin that describes neighborhoods where outsiders settle. Muslim traders typically established Zongo neighborhoods on the outskirts of existing cities and towns. Historically, Zongo neighborhoods were centers of both trade and Islamic piety. Today Because innocence and guilt in traditional Nigerien society apply to whole families, 19 the mothers, fathers, and assorted siblings of both wives are present to witness the gon. 20 The aggrieved husband takes the lead in describing the thefts to the Sarkin, but the family members constantly and loudly interject with additional facts, clarifications, and challenges. 21 The crowd also includes several men and women of various ages from the neighborhood around the Sarkin's compound. 22 They have come to watch the show, for although the reading 23 of the gon is an everyday event in Zongo, the dispute today is more heated and interesting than usual. 24 There also are two young boys lingering on the periphery of the tumult. 25 One of them holds two reeds, each about two feet long, in his hand. 26 The other boy holds an ornate, gold-embossed copy of the Koran in one hand and a rolled, tattered plastic prayer mat in the other. 27 Both boys periodically make eye contact with a tall, thin man who stands off to the side, out of the fray. 28 He is the marabout, the religious leader who will read the words that will give power to the gon oracle. 29 When the Sarkin of Zongo has heard enough from the man, his wives, and their assorted family members, he quiets the crowd and says it is time to consult the oracle. 30 As the parties and the observers settle in, the two young boys who were lingering on the fringe walk toward the center of the room to assume their 23. Whereas in English the verb "perform" would be used in this context (e.g., "the marabout performed the gon"), Nigeriens invariably use the verb "read" (in Zarma, "caw"). As described in the present section of the paper, reading from the Koran is an important element of the oracle. See also infra Part V.B.1. Further, Nigeriens may favor the verb "read" because they generally associate the written word and reading with mystical power, such as that exhibited by the gon oracle. See LADISLAV HOLY, RELIGION AMD roles in the gon. 31 They hand the Koran to the marabout and then roll out the plastic prayer mat. 32 They kneel on the mat facing one another, about two feet apart, and peel off their shirts. 33 Each boy places the ends of the reeds between his thumbs and forefingers, raising them toward his nipples. 34 As they wait for the Sarkin and the marabout to proceed, they hold the reeds between their chests, forming a rectangle in which the reeds are parallel to one another, about eight inches apart. 35 The Sarkin stands beside the kneeling boys and explains to everyone present that, in order to arrive at the full truth, he must name each of the items stolen, and, for each such item, ask each wife to submit to the gon oracle. 36 He announces that the first item tested will be the husband's missing clothing. 37 He directs the senior wife to stand next to him, leading her through an oath that focuses the gon's revelatory powers solely on the stolen clothing (ensuring that it does not react to some other wrong she has committed) and states that, if she is guilty, the reeds will bend toward her hand and "trap" her.
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The Sarkin then instructs the senior wife to bend over and place her hand between the two reeds. 39 As she does so, the two boys place the ends of the reeds against their nipples and, leaning slightly toward one another, suspend them between their chests. 40 At the instant the wife lowers her hand, the marabout, who is sitting in the corner, begins to chant the yassina, a verse from the holy Koran.
41
A l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y t h e r e e d s b e g i n t o w o b b l e , a n d t h e n b o w definitively outward, indicating that the senior wife is innocent of stealing the clothing. 42 The junior wife is then called to submit to the same procedure. 43 This time, the reeds bow inward, indicating that she is guilty. 44 She does not protest her innocence; she simply walks back to her place and waits for her next turn. 45 In this fashion, the Sarkin proceeds methodically through the list of stolen items. 46 The gon reveals that the junior wife stole the clothing and the money, while the senior wife stole the expensive prayer rugs.
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W h e n t h e gon i s complete, both wives admit before their families and the gathered crowd that they have been justly found guilty of their wrongs. 48 The Sarkin, the marabout, and the fathers of both wives huddle together for a quick consultation and agree that the husband and his wives should return immediately to their community and gather the elders together in an attempt to negotiate peace among the family members.
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III. THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
A. THE WASHINGTON LEGAL CONSENSUS IN GENERAL
The primary impetus for Niger's current state law reform project comes from the Washington Legal Consensus. 50 While it is true that western-educated urban elites 51 and some rural elites 52 express enthusiasm for legal westernization, the push has come primarily from donor countries and the financial institutions they control.
53
In general, the Consensus holds that economic and social development (the theory assumes that the latter inevitably follows the former) are possible only if poor countries "privilege[] the market as the locus of economic decision- 53. See CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that the Bretton Woods institutions have played a key role in the process of economic restructuring, and arguing that while the IMF and the World Bank constitute a powerful international bureaucracy, the seat of political power does not rest with the international financial institutions and their major share-holders).
making."
54 Accordingly, the Consensus calls for reducing social spending and reallocating resources to the private sector, 55 b u d g e t a r y a u s t e r i t y , t r a d e liberalization and privatization, 56 and privatization of agricultural land. 57 The legal part of the Consensus requires poor countries to reform their laws as a means of permitting the prosperity promised by the Consensus economic policies.
58
U n d e r t h e r u b r i c o f g o o d g o v e r n a n c e , t h e C o n s e n s u s r e q u i r e s transparency, consistency, and predictability of laws in order to provide potential investors with a stable, inviting governmental and legal framework in which to do business.
59
Poor countries often have little choice in the matter of reform. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), along with other multilateral financial institutions and bilateral donor countries, dole out money to poor countries in the form of "policy based loans" that contain so-called conditionalities. 60 These conditionalities state, in essence, that the poor countries will not get this money unless their governments comply fully with the prepackaged economic and legal reforms. 61 This Article discusses in Part IV.D how Niger is faring as a result of its submission to the Consensus, but, in general, the track record of these externally inspired reforms, including the law reform project, has been poor. 62 54. Gathii, supra note 2, at 145. 55. Id. 56. CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 2, at 35. 57. Id. at 64. 58. See Kurtz, supra note 50, at 1104 (noting that the idea behind the Washington Consensus is that "supplied laws on corporate and financial frameworks . . . would improve the existing legal framework and further economic development" of debtor countries).
59. Brietzke, supra note 8, at 4; see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Introduction to GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that the World Bank and other institutions concerned with economic development have hired more lawyers to build their programs aimed to strengthen the rule of law); Kurtz, supra note 50, at 1104 (noting the idea behind the Washington Consensus that supplied laws on corporate and financial frameworks would improve the exisitng legal framework and further economic development); Sally Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 570 (2003) (arguing that rule of law and judicial reforms are motivated by economic considerations, such as the need to establish a legal infrastructure for investment and trade as countries all over the world strive "to become valued members of the so-called international community"); Mission d'Analyse, supra note 19, at 107 (explaining the Government of Niger's articulation of the connection between legal reform and economic development).
60. CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 2, at 51. 61. Id. at 51-52 (adding that countries declining to comply with the structural adjustment dictates of the Bretton Woods organizations find themselves cut off not only from their economic largess, but from grants and loans by other multilateral and bilateral sources of funds in the West); see also Kurtz, supra note 50, at 1105 (arguing that international financial institutions controlled by the West can force developing countries to sign off on law reform plans by threatening to withhold desperately needed financial support).
62. See Garth & Dezalay, supra note 59, at 2 (arguing that the new "rule of law industry" cannot claim many successes); see also Zafar, supra note 2, at 4, 20 (concluding that the World Bank-inspired structural adjustment program for Niger, particularly its trade liberalization B.
THE LEGAL CONSENSUS IN NIGER
It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a detailed description of Niger's externally developed plans for economic and legal reform. As to economic reform, it must suffice to say that the plan is roughly in accord with the general description of the Consensus provided above, 63 and that thus far it has caused pain and consternation among Niger's people and little, if anything, in the way of beneficial economic development.
64
The law reform aspects of the plan are somewhat more difficult to discern because there is no single World Bank or IMF document that sketches its contours. 65 Therefore, determining how successful the law reform plan has been requires at least partial reliance on newspaper accounts, interviews with government officials, and speculation.
Since 1999, the year in which Niger's most recent military dictator was ejected and the country launched into its first sustained period of democratic governance, the pace of legal reform has been blinding. 66 at w w w . p l a n e t e a f r i q u e . c o m / R e p u b l i c a i n -N i g e r / n e w s _ p r i n t . Given the rapidity of the reform effort, it should not come as a surprise that many of the new laws whizzed by without opportunities for significant debate or reflection about their impact on Nigerien society. 69 They were drafted mostly by outside experts 70 and rushed through Niger's National Assembly, a newly created legislative body consisting of representatives, a significant percentage of whom neither speak nor read French-the language in which the laws were written. 71 In most fundamental respects, these newly reformed laws are like the laws of the United States and Western Europe: they emphasize the protection of individual rights, due process, rational proof, and the individual punishment and deterrence of anti-social acts. 69. See Brietzke, supra note 8, at 22 (arguing that Western legal reformers' desire to "get things done quickly" leads them to implement reforms that are "rushed, poor in quality, and unimplemented or unimplementable").
70. See Interview with Oumarou Rabo Mainassara, supra note 50 (stating that the Ministry of Justice official in charge of reviewing new laws has no personnel at its disposal and not even an internet connection in its office, making it impossible to give substantive input on all of the laws being passed in Niger).
71. When I posed the question to Nigerien scholars whether the legislature debated and discussed the impact that this view of justice would have on rural communities, they laughed. In the case of the Penal Code, there was barely time to read the draft before it was passed, and, even if there had been time, a majority of the members of the National Assembly are not fluent in French and cannot read or write their own mother tongues. According to gossip among lawyers in Niamey, the process of drafting and passing the Penal Code was so rushed that the initially passed version had to be withdrawn when judicial officials realized that the country did not have enough jail cells for all the people who would be imprisoned under the new laws. The most significant change to the new Criminal Code is the adoption of uncomplicated language to the effect that "no one is criminally responsible except for by his own acts." 75 T h i s s t a t e m e n t m a y a p p e a r u n r e m a r k a b l e a n d uncontroversial to a Western lawyer, but in fact it was inserted with the intention of affecting a fundamental change in the way Nigeriens view criminal responsibility. 76 Instead of placing responsibility for crimes with families and larger social units, as described in Part IV.D.2, this new law places responsibility for crime, and the attendant punishment, only on the individual wrongdoer.
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The newly reformed Criminal Code also attempts to bring Niger into the modern world by creating penalties for female genital mutilation, the intentional transmission of HIV, sexual harassment, genocide, war crimes, and the practice of slavery, in addition to conforming its domestic law to the many international treaties it has signed since independence. 78 In keeping with the World Bank's economic goals, it creates new criminal categories for practices that retard economic progress, such as usury and Internet fraud. 79 Likewise, the new Code of Criminal Procedure lays out a scheme that should be familiar to any Western lawyer. It enshrines notions of due process and fair trial. For example, it provides that the criminally accused will have the right to the assistance of counsel. 80 It further provides for procedural guarantees that limit the time and scope of criminal investigations and reduce the use of pre-trial detention. 81 It even offers the possibility of financial compensation for those who have been wrongly detained by judicial authorities.
82
I n s h o r t , i t c r e a t e s a Western system of criminal procedure based on the assumptions that crimesincluding theft-are matters to be resolved between individual perpetrators and the state, and that responsibility is to be determined through a process of rational the Western countries who help write the laws pay to have a certain number of copies printed. Officials in the government ministries that are affected by the new laws typically sell their allotted copies to private book dealers who hawk their wares from street side tables. One searching for printed versions of official laws must therefore wander through the capital haggling with the book dealers.
75. 83 do not permit families and larger communities to resolve criminal matters through ad hoc negotiation, 84 do not provide for reinsertion into the community, 85 a n d d o n o t p e r m i t t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f spiritually determined oracular evidence, such as that produced by the gon.
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There is another vitally important aspect of Niger's legal reform that is not revealed anywhere in the text of the laws that are being promulgated. It is assumed that the modernization of Niger's law requires not only that new Western laws be passed, but that they be consistently and uniformly enforced. 87 Such enforcement is not possible, reformers contend, unless the country's irrational and unpredictable legal traditions, such as reliance on the gon oracle, are eliminated.
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The Washington Legal Consensus will be discussed further in Part VI. For now, this Article shifts its attention to a subject that proponents of the Washington Legal Consensus seem consistently to ignore: the culture and the law of the place that is to be westernized; in this case, Niger.
IV. BACKGROUND ON NIGER
Relatively little has been written in English about Niger, 89 but a few points of paramount importance can be discerned. First, it is extremely poor. 90 Second, largely due to that material poverty, it has remained comparatively isolated from the Western world. 91 
A. VITAL STATISTICS
According to the United Nations, Niger is the least developed country in the World.
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Approximately four-fifths of its landmass is located in the Sahara Desert, and only a small percentage of its land is arable. 93 Niger's population stands at more than thirteen million, with an annual population growth rate at 2.92%, and a fertility rate of 7.46 live births per woman, which ranks among the highest in the world. 94 More than a quarter of Nigerien children die before they reach the age of five, and a child born between 2000 and 2005 has less than a 40% chance of surviving to the age of sixty-five. 95 Overall life expectancy is fortyfour years, which ranks among the lowest in the world. 96 This truncated average life span is even more remarkable when compounded by the fact that HIV/AIDS is not prevalent in Niger, and thus is not a major cause of early mortality.
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Niger's adult literacy rate is 14%, and only 38% of eligible children were enrolled in primary school during the 2002-2003 academic year.
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T h o s e numbers are markedly lower for Nigerien women, and overall, the United Nations ranks Niger last in the world in terms of building the capabilities of women.
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Per capita gross domestic product in Niger is US$835 per year, 100 and 61% of Niger's population lives on less than a dollar a day. 101 Rural subsistence agriculture, livestock, the uranium-mining sector, and informal trading activities account for most of the country's meager economic activity.
102
Niger's development trend is markedly downward. In the early and mid1970s, the country enjoyed a brief period of relative economic prosperity based upon exploitation of uranium deposits in its northern mountains, but the bottom dropped out of that market in the early 1980s, and Niger's economy has been in 92. Id. at 229 (noting that Niger ranks last in terms of the human development index Niger's prospects are clouded by a lack of natural resources and a highly degraded natural environment, explosive population growth, extremely low human and institutional capacity, very limited international competitiveness, its location in a particularly volatile sub-regional context, uncertain donor commitment, and years of poor governance.
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How did Niger arrive at this conjuncture? A glance at its history, focusing on the history of the southwestern portion of the country, reveals that for several centuries it has remained comparatively isolated from many of the currents that have swept across the African continent, including colonization and globalization.
B. A HISTORY OF ISOLATION
Although the territory that is now Niger was influenced by and occasionally home to pre-colonial city states, principalities, and empires, a unified, centralized state did not exist in this region when the French colonists arrived at the turn of the nineteenth century.
105
T h e r e w a s n o o v e r a r c h i n g p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p , n o hereditary leadership class, and, most significantly, no formal courts or unified legal system.
106
Though life for Nigerien people changed with colonization, 107 profound French cultural, social, and legal influences were confined mostly to urban areas 108 and to an educated class of evolues, or "evolved people," through whom the French ruled. 109 Because Niger possessed few exploitable natural resources, Niger's pre-and post-independence states were "minimal," that traditional chiefs were left to govern rural areas, and that there has been an "extraordinary continuity in the resistance to intrusion by the state, both colonial and post colonial").
109. See CHARLICK, supra note 89, at 40 (discussing the post-World War II growth of the the French practiced what the economic and social historian Sara Berry refers to as "hegemony on a shoestring." 110 By and large, this practice meant that the French were happy to let rural Nigeriens govern themselves as they pleased, so long as they paid taxes, planted the cash crops dictated by France's economic strategy, and supplied sufficient numbers of young men for road construction and other colonial infrastructure projects.
111
The consequence of "hegemony on a shoestring" was that the traditions of rural people in Niger, including their legal traditions, survived longer than they would have if, for example, the country had been endowed with diamonds or valuable timber. 112 This explains, at least in part, why legal traditions such as the gon oracle are vibrant in Niger at the dawn of the twenty-first century.
Many Nigerien legal traditions, including the use of the gon oracle to identify wrongdoers, exist at the intersection of Western categories of religion and law. While such categories do not exist in the minds of most Nigeriens, this Article continues to rely on them for ease of explanation.
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C. COMPLEX SPIRITUAL BELIEFS
To understand Niger's complex belief system, this section begins with an overview of Niger's pre-Islamic traditions 114 a n d t h e n b r i e f l y s k e t c h e s t h e historical development of Islam in Niger. The discussion closes with a description of Niger's contemporary blend of traditional and Islamic beliefs.
1.
Pre-Islamic Spiritual Belief Pre-Islamic Nigerien beliefs divided the country into social and spirit domains.
115
Humans who inhabited the social domain were powerless actors in a universe filled with powerful spiritual forces that could and sometimes did destroy 113. See infra Part V.A (discussing categorical confusion in legal ethnography). 114. As with the designations "law" and "religion," here again I have chosen a problematic label for the sake of clarity. By using the phrase "pre-Islamic beliefs," I hope to invoke a category that will seem sensible to my Western audience, thereby clarifying this information. However, as discussed below in Part III.C.3, these practices might have developed alongside of Islam rather than before it, and Islam might have influenced their development. In short, the term I use oversimplifies a complex reality.
115 individuals and social groups. 116 The spirits controlled everything from cropdestroying grasshoppers and other vermin to the weather, sickness, and longevity. 117 The actors in the spirit realm included a pantheon of hundreds of individual spirits-some good and some helpful-while others were evil and vengeful.
118 If offended, they could wreak havoc in the lives of mortal men and women. 119 Communication between the social and spirit realms was possible, and in fact could be necessary for maintaining harmony and health in the social realm. 120 Typically, mortals who had some misfortune or evil visited upon them and would organize a possession ceremony in which spirits would possess the bodies of humans and, communicating through them, explain why they were offended and what the humans could do to atone. 123 The Islam that eventually took root in Niger is a supple, flexible variety that tolerates divergent traditions and worldviews. 124 One reason for its flexibility is the Islamic doctrine of ijma, which holds that the consensus of the community of believers is divinely inspired and infallible 125 Another reason for the flexibility of Niger's religion is that most citizens follow Islam's Sufi tradition. 129 To a Sufi Muslim, 130 the goal of religion is to find and follow the path to personal communion with God, and the strict rules of the Koran are regarded merely as points of departure that lead to that lofty path. 131 Sufi Muslims are particularly tolerant of ancestor veneration and the belief in mystical powers of spirits, provided that Allah remains preeminent, and people do not pray directly to those spirits.
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It is also a characteristic of Sufi Islam that a saintly, mystical master guide the devotee's spiritual quest. 133 In Niger, and across West Africa, such men, for they invariably are men, are referred to as marabouts. 134 Once a marabout is fully trained and his reputation is established, his community relies on him to ward off misfortune and bring good luck, or barka. 135 Marabouts accomplish this by creating charms that protect travelers from harm, 136 136. Before leaving Niger, friends from the village of Fandou Berri commissioned a marabout to make charms for my three children in order to protect them on their journey back to the United States. The ritual consisted of selected verses from the Koran written on folded paper, encased in protective leather pouches, which were then attached to string to be worn around my children's necks.
137. During my recent stay in Niger, I was alarmed one day to learn from a friend that there had been a measles outbreak in his village and that a child had died. He assured me that the villagers had obtained safari, or medicine, that the outbreak had been contained, and that his compel love and devotion from reluctant members of the opposite sex, 138 and serve countless other protective and preventative functions.
139
A s w i l l b e discussed at some length in Part V, Nigerien Sufi Muslims also rely on marabouts to dispense with Western notions of "law" by identifying thieves and other wrongdoers. 
3.
Today's Religious Mixed Bag Today, while the vast majority of Niger's people follow Islam and the Five Pillars, 141 the processes of adaptation and evolution described above have left their Islamic practice with many elements that orthodox Middle Eastern Muslims find foreign, even heretical. 142 This includes, for example, the belief that a person can obtain Islamic charms that will make any knife turned against him melt before it penetrates his flesh. 143 It also means that people believe that they can and children were no longer in danger. Later, when I visited the village and observed that all of the young children were laden with leather pouches, I inquired and learned that the "medicine" my friend had referred to was the charms that had been created by a powerful local marabout. Zarmas use the word safari to mean "treatment" or "cure" and also "medicine. 139. See Owusu-Ansah, supra note 135, at 478-79 (explaining the use of amulets and charms as "protective or healing agents"); Interview with Oumarou Alzuma, in Niamey, Niger (Apr. 14, 2004) (stating that his work as a marabout includes healing the sick and writing verses that will help his clients intercede with God and get the result they are seeking). See generally HOLY, supra note 23, at 25-33 (explaining that the Koran is believed to have immense power to guarantee the well-being of those who internalize it, and that the literate achieve this result by memorizing it, while the illiterate achieve the same effect by wearing Koranic verses as amulets or by drinking ink that has been used in writing Koranic verses).
140. See supra Part II; infra Part V.B.4 (describing the use of the gon to identify thieves). 141. See HOLY, supra note 23, at 1 (naming the Five Pillars as: (1) to bear witness to the oneness of God, (2) to perform five daily prayers, (3) to fast during Ramadan, (4) to pay annual alms, and (5) to carry out the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once).
142. Scholars disagree on the historical mechanism by which Niger, and more generally West Africa, developed its heterodox, magic-infused brand of Islam. Some speak of the "survival" of pre-Islamic practices. Their belief is that people living in West African communities that were introduced to Islam maintained their pre-Islamic beliefs and practices by simply layering a thin veneer of Islamic ritual onto their traditions, ultimately calling them Muslim. See HOLY, supra note 23, at 42. Other scholars speak of "great" and "little" traditions in Islam-the "great" being more orthodox beliefs and practices that emanate from the Middle East (where Islam was born), and the "little" being the folk ways that have been incorporated into Islam as it has spread. See 143. This statement is based on an unrecorded conversation with Bachirou Djibo that took should rely on oracles such as the gon, which are nominally Islamic, to resolve certain kinds of legal disputes.
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D. LAW IN NIGER
This section begins with an overview of the state legal system in Niger, and then turns to a discussion of how most Nigeriens actually understand the law.
State Law in Niger
Immediately following independence from France in 1960, Niger adopted the French Civil Code as its own state law, while adding an exception clause that excluded those laws that conflicted with Niger's new constitution.
145
T h i s exception clause gave rise to enduring confusion because no one bothered to identify which laws might conflict. 146 In the end it hardly mattered because Niger spent most of the following decades under military rule, and state law was reduced to whatever the soldiers said it was. 147 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, Niger has been lurching unevenly toward democratic rule.
148
I t is only since 1999-the beginning of Niger's current sustained period of democracy and relative stability-that the country's leaders, encouraged by donor nations and international financial institutions, 149 began taking a close look at its legal system, with an eye toward making it coherent, rational, and modern.
150
From both the government's perspective and the perspective of legal experts from Western donor countries, Niger's law is based upon a Constitution, adopted in 1999, that enshrines principles familiar to the West. 151 For example, it embraces the separation of powers (Titles I-III), the separation of church and state (Article 4), a society based on the rule of law (Article 99), an independent place during the early spring of 2004. Devout Nigerien Muslims also consistently acknowledge the presence and importance of their ancestors' spirits. To give one example, a friend living in a rural Zarma village built a new grass hut for himself and his family, taking advantage of a prime spot of real estate that had been vacated when his paternal grandmother died. When asked why he did not build the new hut on the sand foundation of the old one, he responded matter-of-factly that he did not want to risk harm to his family by offending his grandmother's spirit. Interview with Gibirou Djibo, in Fandou Berri, Niger (May 6, 2004 judiciary (Articles 100 and 101), and a respect for internationally defined human rights (Articles 10-34).
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Niger's court system also follows a Western pattern. It has a Supreme Court based in its capital, two courts of appeal-one in Niamey and one in Niger's second city, Zinder-six regional tribunals distributed throughout the country, and twenty-five judicial delegations handling smaller cases.
153
Beginning at independence and continuing through Niger's recent law reforms, Niger's state legal system has embraced and legitimated certain aspects of what it refers to as droit coutumier, or "customary law." 154 Specifically, in matters concerning marriage, divorce, filiation, succession, gifts, testaments, and in certain matters concerning commercial contracts and real property, judges may apply customary law to resolve disputes. 155 Most significantly, the state does not permit the application of customary law in criminal matters.
156
On paper, and from a Western perspective, Niger's legal system appears quite orderly and rational: it enshrines principles of individual and human rights, borrows the structure of Western legal systems, and honors non-Western legal traditions by carving out a limited domain for the application of "customary law." . The chiefs' participation in the law of contemporary Niger is confusing because they play two very distinct roles. At times, they act as quasi-state administrators who are specifically empowered to conciliate in certain disputes; at other times, acting as traditional leaders completely unconnected to the state or its formal system of laws, they serve to resolve disputes and achieve justice. Assuming this is how Niger's contemporary legal system works, it begs the question: what could be wrong with the current reforms, the goal of which is to update and modernize that system? However, this question presumes that Niger's contemporary law is actually that which is described in its written legal texts.
157
As the discussion below reveals, that is far from the case.
2.
The Dominance of Non-State Law in Niger In fact, Niger's legal system appears completely different from the perspective of most of its citizens. To them, the rational and orderly system described above is unknown, and they come into contact with it only when absolutely necessary.
158
For most Nigeriens, particularly rural people, one obvious problem with the state's law is that it is written in French, a language that an overwhelming majority of its citizens does not understand. 159 Even for Francophonic Nigeriens, the infusion of French culture in Niger's state legal system presents insuperable barriers: lawyers, judges, and court personnel, many of whom are educated in France, dash about wearing long black robes and ceremonial ruffled collars, communicating to one another in technical legal terms, leaving the average Nigerien petitioner completely mystified.
160
A further problem with Niger's law is that its people view the state legal system as irreparably corrupt. 161 Those citizens who know anything at all about the state system know that it is impossible to obtain justice without offering money to the judge. 162 157. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 158. Kelley, supra note 19, at 659 (arguing that rural Nigeriens rarely know or care about the content of state law); Tankoano, supra note 154, at 135, 137 (noting that despite the existence of state jurisdiction, the large majority of the population prefers resort to the parallel sturctures for resolving their conflcits); see also Chaibou, L'Influence de la Jurisprudence, supra note 155, at 71; Chegou, supra note 116, at 2; Idrissa, supra note 108, at 26-27 (arguing that Nigeriens today identify much more closely with their traditional rulers than with the Nigerien nation-state).
159. 162. Alou, La Justice au Plus Offrant, supra note 161, at 64-66. Influence peddling is another frequent form of corruption. Although the independence of state judges is guaranteed by Articles 98 and 100 of Niger's Constitution, parties to legal proceedings often prevail by seeking intervention from politicians of the executive branch of government. The politicians phone the judges with instructions on how to rule in a given case, and if the judges fail to obey, they likely find themselves assigned to backwater posts or stuck in the lower rungs of the civil service. See id. at 66.
Even those rare citizens who desire contact with the state's legal system have great difficulty because it is fatally under-resourced. In 2002, there were 140 judges in the country, translating to approximately one judge for every 80,000 inhabitants. 163 Lawyers are even harder to find. In 2003, there were seventyseven lawyers 164 practicing in the entire country, none of whom maintained an office outside of Niamey. 165 The courthouses and other government facilities are widely disbursed and virtually impossible to reach, since travel via public transportation is beyond the means of most Nigeriens. 166 The rare citizen who does find his or her way to a courthouse encounters the most Spartan of conditions. Most have no library, computers, or even basic amenities, such as telephone lines or usable office furniture. 167 Even if Nigeriens could overcome all of these barriers and shortcomings, the substance of the laws applied in the state courthouse would make little sense to them. 168 The traditional, non-state law that most Nigeriens rely upon is premised on a culturally distinct notion of justice. 169 First, traditional law in Niger is based on process, not rules. 170 Parties, rather than lawyers, negotiate equitable outcomes to their disputes.
171
W h i l e t h e r e a r e f l e x i b l e n o r m s concerning who should participate in the negotiation, in general, elders, traditional chiefs, and respected spiritual leaders act as facilitators and guide the parties toward a just outcomes. 172 In guiding the parties, the community leaders draw upon no fixed body of rules or precedent, and rarely, if ever, bring state law or Islamic sharia law into the discussion. 173 Significantly, the leaders' goal in these discussions is not to punish the wrongdoer, exact vengeance, or even protect the rights of the party who claims to have been injured; rather, they seek an outcome that will restore equilibrium to the social unit. Often, the process of restoring equilibrium to the village or extended family involves asking the perceived wrongdoer to compensate the victim for his loss. 175 However, it is also common that a victim's request for compensation will be met with a reminder that his ancestor owed some debt of gratitude to the family of the wrongdoer and that the victim can pay that debt by forbearing in this particular instance. 176 Where the parties agree that immediate compensation is warranted, the victim is typically content receiving compensation from the wrongdoer's family rather than from the wrongdoer himself, 177 demonstrating that, even for the parties, the goal of the process is to restore the community, not punish the wrongdoer. 178 In stark contrast to the law of the West, Nigerien tradition makes no categorical distinction between public law and private law, nor does it conceptually separate criminal law from civil law.
179
L aw is a process for establishing a modus vivendi for a community and is inextricably interwoven with family relations, community relations, history, and spiritual beliefs. 180 Below, specific examples of the law as it is understood and practiced by most Nigeriens will be discussed. 181. While the gon is considered Islamic, some Nigeriens rely on non-Islamic oracles to help resolve legal disputes. The tarkama oracle, for example, is led by a traditional priest called the Magagin Duma who presides over a ceremony in which a goat is slaughtered and placed on a litter. Four litter bearers hoist the goat carcass, which then leads them to the wrongdoer. See Chegou, supra note 116, at 9-11. A similar oracle, the tunguma, relies on a magic stone to lead its bearers to the guilty party. Chegou, supra note 116, at 18-24. Interestingly, ancient Egyptian oracles used a similar method, placing a figure of a deity on a litter that then would physically lead the litter bearers to the wrongdoer. 183 Third, it furnishes a convenient contrast with Western law because, while the Washington Legal Consensus has made reform of the country's Criminal Codes a priority, the gon is what Nigerien people are relying upon to achieve the same result.
V. THE USE OF THE GON ORACLE IN NIGER
184
T h e Article's exploration of the gon begins with a brief discussion regarding research methodology.
A. METHODOLOGY OF STUDYING THE GON
Traditional law in Niger is not written, so one cannot hope to learn about it without venturing into the field to observe and inquire about it. 185 My exploration of Niger's legal traditions, particularly the gon, has relied on a mix of interviews and observation that took place during a year of fieldwork in Niger in [2003] [2004] as well as two month-long visits in 2000 and 1996. In rural areas, most of the interviews I conducted were semi-structured group interviews, a form of information-gathering that is unavoidable in small villages where adult men of noble birth feel entitled to insert themselves into all but the most intimate of conversations. In the capital, Niamey, I was able to perform some one-on-one interviews and, on three occasions, witnessed the gon in action. 186 Nigeriens speak various languages, and grappling with them added a certain amount of extra work and imprecision to my study of the gon.
187 But linguistic complications are merely the skin of a more profound methodological challenge: categorical confusion. Any attempt to understand and describe another 129 (2001) . There also are reports of oracles in Niger that involve sticking needles into chunks of soap, see Interview with Oumarou Alzuma, supra note 139, staring into water, drawing figures in the sand and scattering cowry shells, see Chegou, supra note 116, at 34-37, and administering poison to the suspected wrongdoer, see Arzika, supra note 112, at 129.
182. See I n t e r v i e w w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t o f I s l a m i c A s s ' n , C a d i s , a n d C h e f d e C a n t o n ' s Sec'y, supra note 88.
183. See Interview with group of villagers, supra note 175; Interview with group of villagers, in Fandou Berri, Niger (May 26, 1996).
184. See Interview with group of villagers, supra note 175; Interview with group of villagers, supra note 183.
185. See Interview with the President of Islamic Ass'n, Cadis, and Chef de Canton's Sec'y, supra note 88.
186. For unknown reasons-perhaps because the novelty of my presence wore off or because I was reluctant to pay for the privilege-I was not invited to witness any gons after the initial three. Though I spent much of my time in rural areas, I have never witnessed a rural gon for the simple reason that thefts and other wrongdoings occur infrequently in small villages and, when they do, usually are resolved by means of mediation and negotiation.
187. Most of the interviews were conducted in Zarma, a language I speak and understand reasonably well. Some interviews, particularly in the capital city, were in Hausa, of which I know nothing. In all the interviews, I was aided by a collaborator, Bachir Tidiani, who is fluent in Zarma, Hausa, and French. culture risks skimming over the fact that different cultures categorize and understand the world differently. A simple but important example of this categorical dissonance is my use of the word "law" throughout this paper. As alluded to during the discussion of spiritual beliefs in Part IV.B, Nigeriens, particularly rural Nigeriens, do not conceive of a socio-cultural category called "law" the way Westerners do.
188
For them, there is no conceptual division between "law" and the rest of their social and spiritual lives. 189 In fact, the Zarma language contains no word for "law."
190 Thus, when I use the terms "law" and "legal" in the parts of this Article that discuss Western law, I am using culturally appropriate descriptors. However, when I use those words in discussions of traditional Nigerien "law," I am, in a sense, cheating: falling back upon convenient, shorthand descriptions that Western language and worldview include but theirs do not.
191
Where mystical phenomena are involved, the potential for categorical confusion is even greater. This is because oracles, magic, and the occult, all of which are employed in traditional law, occupy fundamentally different positions in Western worldviews.
To Westerners, these subjects are exotic and supernatural; they are the stuff of fireside ghost stories that send tingles up listeners' spines. 192 But to most Nigeriens, such phenomena are mundane. 190. When referring to Western category of "law," Zarmas usually use French terms such as droit and justice. The closest word Nigeriens can produce in their language for "law" is chimi, which means "truth." Kelley, supra note 19, at 635 n.2.
191. Another example of linguistic differences is use of the English word "oracle" to describe the gon and similar religio-magic rites that Nigerien people rely upon to identify wrongdoers. Oracle means "a typically ambiguous or enigmatic revelation or utterance belived to issue from a divinity through a medium (as a priest or priestess) thought to be inspired . . . Zarma language does not include a word for "supernatural"
194 b e c a u se th e y believe magical and mystical phenomena are perfectly natural.
195
T h e o n ly mystery concerns how and when its actors will intrude upon and affect, either positively or negatively, the lives of mortals.
196
The reality of such categorical dissonance can lead to a fascinating debate about whether it is legitimate, or indeed possible, for an outsider to understand and describe the culture, or for that matter the law, of an "other." I intend to sidestep that debate. 197 In this Article, I have attempted to minimize categorical confusion by identifying differences between Nigerien and Western cultural categories and by flagging for the reader any instances where I am sacrificing cultural accuracy for the sake of ease and conceptual clarity.
198
B e f o r e proceeding, it is worth noting that Washington Legal Consensus reformers evince no understanding of the possibility that the "law" they seek to impose on Niger is not a familiar or appropriate category for the societies upon which they are acting.
EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, ORACLES AND MAGIC AMONG THE AZANDE 64-68, 80-83 (1968).
194. Jean-Pierre Olvier de Sardan, Occultism and the Ethnographic "I": The Exoticizing of Magic from Durkheim to "Postmodern" Anthropology, CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 5, 11, 13 (1992). Zarmas refer to the spirit world as ganji or "bush," providing insight into their conception of that realm. Designating it as "bush" assigns it a temporal and spiritual location outside the structured life of the village but still very much connected to it. The village, kwara, is where relations and social outcomes are subject to human control and agency. The bush, which begins just beyond the village's fields, is a place where life is not ordered and mortals enjoy no domain, especially after dark. See Interview with Village Chief and group of elders, supra note 107.
195 198. Others have discussed challenges faced by Western researchers who attempt to describe mystical phenomena. The venerable E. E. Evans Pritchard, when writing about witchcraft and oracles among the Zande people of the Sudan, noted that the researcher felt the need to supply his Western readers with an account of the mystical phenomenon that is orderly and rational when that which is observed often is neither and when, to most Westerners, the very notion of using magic or consulting oracles is the quintessence of irrationality. 
B. THE GON
During my recent year of fieldwork in Niger, I collected accounts of sixteen gon oracles, eleven of which took place in the Zongo neighborhood of Niamey.
200
The first gon I observed was described in Part II. Below, I will provide descriptions of another Zongo gon I witnessed, and, in the course of analyzing those gons, refer to illustrative cases from among the many secondhand accounts I have collected.
Origin of Gon
The origin of the gon is obscure. 201 Unlettered rural people generally insist that the entire procedure for the gon is laid out in detail in the Koran.
202 This is not the case. 203 One Nigerien scholar of Arabic language and Islam told me that he is quite sure that the gon was adapted from pre-Islamic practice and that the ritual incantations that once accompanied it were simply replaced by the reading of Koranic verses. 204 Although this may be true, that scholar could point to no particular reason for assuming it to be so and knew of no research that had been performed on the subject. 205 A learned marabout from the Nigerien holy city of Say dismissed the gon entirely, saying it was merely a children's game that had caught on among naïve people in Niger. 206 In sum, theories about the origins of the gon are mere speculation, and all that can be said with certainty is that today it 200 . This Article may provide what is perhaps a skewed sampling on gon oracles that took place in Niamey's Zongo neighborhood because the urban Zongo gon has regular interaction with the state police and court system, while rural gon practitioners and parties rely almost exclusively on the oracle to identify wrongdoers and rarely have any contact with the state system. Zongo Field Notes 00005, in Niamey, Niger (June 14, 2004) . In spite of this Article's emphasis on the Zongo gon, a majority of gon accounts I have recorded took place in rural villages. See Kelley, supra note 19, at 673-680.
201. For a discussion of whether oracles and other mystical phenomena in contemporary West Africa can justly be described as pre-Islamic, see supra note 142. Because this Article's primary interest is in the role that the gon plays in contemporary Nigerien legal culture and law, it avoids any debate about whether it is, as some maintain, an animist "holdover" sporting a thin veneer of is practiced widely, at least throughout southwestern Niger, 207 and that the gon of the Zongo neighborhood in Niamey is widely considered to be the "standard." 208 The Zongo neighborhood was founded and populated long ago by pious Islamic Hausa traders. 209 In the 1960s, Malam Hassan, a resident of Zongo, was the most important Islamic leader in Niamey. 210 He maintained a Koranic school that drew students from around the region.
211
In 1964, he suggested to the grandfather of the present Sarkin of Zongo that they should begin reading the gon at his school. 212 The Zongo gon's reputation for accuracy spread rapidly, and soon people were traveling from far and wide to consult it. 213 Taking advantage of the Zongo gon's perceived infallibility , Niamey law enforcement officials regularly sent parties to Zongo to determine culpability and resolve disputes. 
2.
Sarkin of Zongo Two principal actors animate the Zongo gon: the Sarkin of Zongo and the Zongo marabout. The present Sarkin was born in 1954 and was chosen by acclamation to lead the community when his father died in 1993. 215 Today he acts as the traditional chief for the Zongo neighborhood, convening elders to decide neighborhood policy, organizing communal labor projects, helping conciliate when families or individuals fall into conflict, and collecting taxes that he sends 207 . My fieldwork has focused on this region. While it is clear that the gon is widespread in this zone, I am less certain that it is widely practiced in other parts of Niger. I have heard accounts of the gon being performed in other regions of Niger and in other countries in West Africa, but people from southwestern Niger were always involved, leaving it unclear whether the gon was indigenous to those other areas. See, e.g., Interview with Chief and group of elders, in Saabu Dey, Niger (Dec. 18, 2003) (recounting a gon that took place among Zarma men who were living temporarily in Mali). I also have seen reference to a gon being performed in Diffa, which is near Niger's eastern boarder-more than a thousand kilometers distant from Zongo. Chaibou, L'Influence de la Jurisprudence, supra note 155, at 71. One last bit of evidence arguing for the widespread use of the gon is that the Sarkin of Zongo claims it is of Hausa origin, placing it in central and eastern Niger. See Interview with Hamza Maman Bako, supra note 11.
208 on to Niger's central government. 216 In addition to his other duties, it is his traditional obligation to preside over the gon oracle.
217
When parties approach the Sarkin with a request to submit their dispute or question to the gon, he must decide whether the request is appropriate. 218 Occasionally, he refuses to perform the gon, when, for example, the identity of the transgressor is already certain based on the circumstances. 219 The Sarkin claims that the power of the gon is too great and that the physical danger to the marabout is too extreme to perform the gon when it is not truly needed. 220 When he determines that the gon is appropriate, he presides over the preliminary gathering of facts, guides all parties through the various oaths they must utter, and, ultimately, poses precisely framed questions to the oracle. 
3.
Zongo Marabout The second principle actor in the Zongo gon is the current head marabout of the neighborhood mosque, Oumarou Alzuma. 222 He is in his fifties, but he does not know his exact age. 223 At thirteen, he left his natal village and began his religious studies under a highly respected marabout distantly related to his family. 224 After six years of rigorous Koranic study, he moved to the holy city of Say and spent several more years under the tutelage of important Islamic religious leaders. O v e r th e y e a r s, Oumarou became the Malam's trusted colleague and confidant, eventually moving into the great man's home. 227 A l o n g w i t h o t h e r j u n i o r marabouts, Oumarou led prayers in the Zongo mosque, created Islamic charms and incantations that warded off ill fortune and healed the sick, and, on behalf of pious petitioners, sought God's favor for advantageous business relations, safe travel, or strength against enemies. In approximately 2001, the master of the Zongo gon died, and the Malam initiated Oumarou into its power and informed him of its secrets. 229 This position requires that he be strong and of pure mind and body to avoid being harmed by the gon, which is both powerful and dangerous. 230 Today, it is rare that more than a day goes by without a request for a gon.
231 While the majority of cases involve theft, people sometimes consult the gon for other reasons. 232 For example, there was a recent case where a man who had two wives caught a "social disease" even though he had not had sexual relations outside of marriage. 233 The gon identified the transgressor. 234 Another frequent use of the gon occurs when a child falls ill and the parents suspect sorcery. 235 The parents will consult the gon to determine who has cast the evil spell. 236 Recently, missing cellular telephones have become the most common reason that people consult the Zongo gon. 
Example of Nigerien Traditional Law: Gon Oracle Confirms Identity of Petty Thief
The second gon I witnessed in Zongo was presided over by the Sarkin's younger brother, Boubacar.
238
When I arrived at the Sarkin's compound, preliminary discussions had already taken place and the interested parties had gathered in a courtyard to consult the oracle. 239 Three young men were present-all of whom appeared to be in their early to mid twenties-and one who had been severely beaten. 240 His clothing was stained with blood, his face had open gashes, and his eyes and lips were badly swollen. 241 There were also two middle-aged men in attendance.
242
Each was dressed in professional garb, and, judging by their comportment and fluency in French, both were educated. A theft had brought them to Zongo that day. 244 One of the young men maintained an informal business in Niamey selling cigarettes, matches, chewing gum, aspirin, and other sundries from a small table that he set up next to a road in his community. 245 Some goods disappeared from his table, and he suspected the bloodied man of taking them. 246 At first, the table seller and his brother (the third young man who was present) took the suspect to the police station, where he confessed to the theft and agreed to pay compensation. 247 However, on their return to their neighborhood, the suspect changed his mind, claiming that he had confessed solely because he was afraid of the police. 248 The retraction, and the anger it caused, led to his beating. 249 The table seller and his brother offered to resolve the issue by coming to Zongo to consult the gon, to which the suspect apparently agreed. 250 The two older men were "witnesses" who had tried to mediate the disagreement back in their community and now had come to participate in the gon.
251
Two boys-both Koranic students studying under marabout Oumaroubegan preparing for the gon oracle by rolling out the plastic prayer rug, kneeling to face one another, and peeling off their shirts. 252 The older of the two boys was involved in the first gon, described in Part II. 253 The marabout arrived, squatted with his back against a mud wall, and opened his embossed Koran in preparation for reading the yassina.
254
As the ceremony was about to begin, Boubacar raised the topic of payment with one of the older men.
255 After a brief discussion in Hausa, he turned to address the younger men and, in Zarma, said wo kanda zambar fo, or "give me 5,000 CFA." 256 Having collected the fee, Boubacar instructed the three young men to stand. 258 He asked them their names, at which point the younger brother of the table seller nervously told him that "the things that were stolen were not mine, they were his," pointing to the older brother. 259 He looked over his shoulder toward the benches and seemed to be hoping that he would be dismissed from the proceeding. 260 Boubacar replied that he was a part of this too, and that he had nothing to fear so long as they told the truth.
261
Boubacar then approached the three young men and led the injured one toward the kneeling, shirtless Koran students. 262 He compelled the injured young man to bend at the waist and place his hand between the reeds, which the boys where holding in place with their fingers. 263 As they maintained their positions, Boubacar led the injured man through a recitation in Hausa that was designed to limit the focus of the gon and invoke its power to identify the criminal. 264 When Boubacar finished, the marabout began reading the yassina aloud and the boys removed their fingers from the reeds.
265
T h e y i m m e d i a t e l y b o w e d i n w a r d , indicating that the beaten young man was guilty of the theft. 266 To be certain, Boubacar repeated the entire process.
267
Ag ain, the reeds immediately bent inward. 268 The expression on the beaten young man's face did not change. 269 He waited impassively to be dismissed, and when he was, walked back to his bench and sat down.
270
Having obtained an answer from the gon, the two young men and the two older men huddled with Boubacar to decide what should be done with the gon evidence. 271 The older men agreed to persuade the thief to compensate the seller and avoid further trouble. 272 If he refused, however, they all agreed they would return to the police station to inform the officials that the gon had verified the suspect's guilt. 273 
5.
Further Observations About the Gon From a Western perspective, perhaps the most surprising feature of the gon oracle is that a broad swath of the population considers it infallible. 274 The parties themselves, including those found culpable, generally accept the gon's determination without protest. 275 In the descriptions provided above, as well as in the third gon that I witnessed, all of the accused parties accepted and admitted their guilt once the gon had spoken. 276 This acceptance was most striking in the first gon example, where the two wives, with their extended families in support, maintained their innocence loudly and angrily until the moment the gon delivered its verdict, at which time each admitted publicly that she had been caught. 277 In fact, in the dozens of descriptions of gon ceremonies communicated to me over the years, only two concluded with the identified wrongdoer continuing to deny his guilt. 278 In both of those cases, in accordance with the traditionally accepted norm of group responsibility for social harms, 279 the families of the accused agreed to compensate the victims in spite of the individuals' continuing denials.
280
In addition to the nearly uniform acquiescence of those found guilty by the gon, a broad cross-section of Nigeriens, many of whom are aware of Western skepticism about mystical phenomena, freely offer stories to illustrate its infallibility. 281 According to one such story, a Nigerien man who was living in Cote d'Ivoire many years ago sent a large amount of money back to his natal village in the care of a group of young men with detailed written instructions on how to distribute it. 282 However, when village elders attempted to carry out the instructions, they found that there was not enough money in the package, and they assumed that the youthful couriers had stolen it. 283 The village chief ordered a gon, which determined that all of the youths were innocent. 284 Later, the man sent apologies from Cote d'Ivoire that he had mistakenly enclosed too little money.
285
To the villagers, this story furnished conclusive proof that the gon would never assign blame incorrectly.
286
In another testament to the gon's i n f a l l i b i l i t y , s e v e r a l y e a r s a g o a television station in Niamey did an investigative report of the Zongo gon to test its accuracy.
287 Station employees fabricated a story about a theft and took it to the Sarkin of Zongo, who approved a reading of the gon. 288 The oracle tested each of the suspects but "trapped" no one, proving its infallibility.
289
It is a remarkable sign of the gon's widespread acceptance in Nigerien culture that stories endorsing its power and accuracy come from across the socioeconomic spectrum. In the numerous cases recounted to me by rural peasant farmers, I have never heard anyone doubt the result of a gon. 290 But, unlettered rural people are not the only ones who believe in the gon's power to reveal truth in the context of legal disputes. For example, in the second gon illustration, the witnesses who attended the gon and then participated in negotiating the resolution were educated, sophisticated urbanites. 291 They neither expressed nor exhibited skepticism about the oracle.
292
Other highly educated people have endorsed the gon, often accompanied by a shrug of the shoulders and a statement to the effect of "I don't know how it works, only that it does." 293 One Nigerien man who had earned his PhD from Boston University recounted a story from his youth in which he was accused of stealing a watch. 294 With his honor at stake, he insisted on consulting the gon oracle.
295
He and his companions found a marabout willing to perform the ceremony, and at the critical moment the reeds bent outward, proving his innocence. 296 Based on the gon evidence, his accuser apologized. highly educated and worldly Nigerien professor explained that when he was a middle school student in Niamey in the early 1960s, the Director, a French national, would order a gon p e r f o r m e d w h e n e v e r a n y t h i n g o f v a l u e disappeared. 298 It never failed to identify the responsible party.
299
In addition to the deeply held belief in its infallibility, there are practical reasons why Nigeriens rely on the gon. One is that it permits them to steer questions of law and justice toward traditional leaders, who are thought to be purer of heart than the distant, foreign, and corrupt actors of the state legal system. 300 Although people in the city sometimes bring their theft accusations and other legal matters to the police, 301 it is much more common for parties, particularly in rural areas, to ignore the state system altogether and rely on legal actors who they understand and trust. 302 The first gon example provides a typical example of this phenomenon. In that case, the parties never considered consulting any state legal authority.
303
I n s t e a d , t h e a c c u s e r u t i l i z e d v a r i o u s t r a d i t i o n a l channels of dispute resolution, consulting with family elders, traditional community leaders, and finally the Zongo gon oracle. 304 Neither he nor any of the vocal and agitated actors in the dispute ever even thought to refer the dispute to the state system of justice.
305
Another practical reason why Nigeriens rely on the gon rather than the state legal system is because the gon is speedy while the state is not. The gon succeeds in restoring order and harmony to Nigeriens' families and communities in part because it renders justice quickly. 306 As illustrated by the second gon example, the oracle's relationship to the state system of justice can be complex in urban areas, where people find themselves in close proximity to the police and courts. Zongo Field Notes 00004, supra note 238. Niger's current state law does not permit courts to rely on oracles and other forms of mystical evidence to resolve accusations of theft or other crimes. See supra notes 154-156. In spite of this prohibition, however, police, prosecutors, and judges routinely take gon evidence into consideration and often send parties to the gon to determine the wrongdoer. See Zongo Field Notes 00005, supra note 200. The government itself acknowledges that some state judges do not apply state law and instead base their rulings in petty criminal matters on traditional law. See Mission d'Analyse, supra note 19, at 27. Other judges consciously skirt the prohibition by arguing that the state legal system requires them to attempt conciliation between the parties before pursuing any formal charges. See Interview with Judge Hasimiou, supra note 88. The gon evidence, those judges say, is permitted only as a part of the conciliation phase, whether the judicial officers encourage the parties to seek it out or merely take into consideration as traditional evidence that the parties have already procured. Id. Of course, any distinction between the conciliation phase of a case and the official investigation and prosecution is entirely lost on most Nigeriens. See id. (expressing the view that if irrational evidence helps the parties resolve their disputes in the conciliation phase, so be it).
302. 307 Indeed, in the two gon examples, the accusations, the consultation with the Zongo oracle, and the negotiation over resolutions all took place within the same twenty-four hour period. 308 This time frame presents a stark contrast to the state legal system, which routinely takes years to resolve even the simplest of disputes.
309
While these practical considerations help explain why the gon is popular among Nigeriens seeking justice, there are also more nuanced reasons why so many favor it over the state system. From a Western perspective, discerning those subtler reasons requires an understanding that although the oracle may appear to take the place of a Western trial, its role in traditional law is in fact quite different.
Unlike a trial, which occurs after the parties failed to negotiate a settlement and which ideally functions as a final determination of a legal dispute, a gon oracle serves as an intermediate stage in a process of negotiating a livable resolution to the dispute. 310 Typically, before seeking out the gon, individuals claiming to be the victims of wrongs, accompanied by their immediate and extended families, have already attempted to resolve their disputes through negotiation and mediation. 311 Often, after family elders have failed to resolve the dispute, they seek the intervention of some supra-family traditional authority, usually a village chief or a respected marabout. 312 Only after those means have been exhausted do the parties resort to the gon.
313
Even then, consultation with the gon o r a c le is r a r e ly th e e n d o f th e process.
314
T y p i c a l l y , t h e gon r e s u l t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d a n o t h e r -i f v i t a l a n d irrefutable-piece of evidence to be taken into account in the negotiation between the victim, the accused, their families, and their community. 315 For example, the first gon illustration concluded with an extended huddle between the elders, as preferred over state law because traditional law renders immediate decisions while state law "takes far too long and allows things to fester").
307. See Interview with Garba Sidikou, Chef well as a determination that the parties should return to the traditional authorities in their community to negotiate a satisfactory settlement enabling everyone to live together in harmony.
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S i m i l a r l y , i n t h e s e c o n d gon e x a m p l e , t h e o l d e r professional men in attendance filled the role of elders by urging the guilty party to admit his guilt, compensate the victim, and avoid further trouble. 317 In the vast majority of cases, once the gon has conclusively identified the wrongdoer in a legal matter, a relatively brief discussion follows, facilitated by traditional authority figures, where the wrongdoer and his family agree to pay some combination of material and symbolic compensation to the aggrieved party. 318 This discussion typically ends the matter.
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Consulting the gon oracle is also unlike a Western trial in that the post-gon resolution of the matter does not involve punishing the identified wrongdoer with a fine or jail.
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I n s t e a d , t h e r e s o l u t i o n n o r m a l l y i n v o l v e s a n e g o t i a t e d compensation for the injured party, oftentimes paid, at least in part, by the wrongdoer's family or lineage group, as well as a symbolic welcoming of the wrongdoer's family back into the community. 321 The essence of the resolution prescribed by the elders is typically a combination of an apology and a modus vivendi for the broader community. 322 Ultimately, the role of the gon is to provide clear, reliable facts that permit the parties, their families, and their communities to restore community harmony. 323 Finally, the gon is popular among the people of Niger because it provides them with a form of law that is organically adapted to the rest of their culture. Law, spirituality, and community are considered parts of an undifferentiated whole according to Niger's vibrant traditional beliefs. 324 Because Nigeriens view the world in this categorically unified way, the gon and similar forms of "law" 316. Zongo Field Notes 00001, supra note 10. 317. Zongo Field Notes 00004, supra note 238. 318. Interview with group of villagers, supra note 175. 319. Id. 320. Kelley, supra note 12, at 677-79. There is a vague threat of supernatural sanction from the gon, but the potential for harm seems to be related to the person's purity and honesty in approaching the oracle as opposed to whether the person is guilty or innocent of the alleged wrong. Interview with Hamza Maman Bako, supra note 11. Due to this vague threat of harm, parties sometimes confess before submitting to the oracle. Interview with Oumarou Alzuma, supra note 139 (recounting a case involving a stolen cell phone where one person in a group of potential suspects confessed rather than participate in the gon); see Interview with Boubacar Bako, supra note 215 (recounting an instance where a suspected thief confessed to avoid submitting to the gon); Interview with various elders, in Fandou Berri and Gassangourni, Niger (Nov. 18, 2003) (a rural farmer indicating that the gon is so powerful, particularly when combined with blood sacrifice, that it can kill people).
321 that draw upon religion and the spirit realm-and that are geared toward maintenance of community harmony-make perfect sense.
C. DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON LAW REFORM IN NIGER
From the perspective of the Washington Legal Consensus, state law reform in Niger is a long overdue housekeeping project. Niger must reform its law to keep up with changes in technology, business, and evolving conceptions of human rights. 325 It also must eliminate the multifarious legal traditions that operatelargely unregulated and unsupervised-around the country and impose a uniform, predictable legal regime. 326 Without such modernizing changes, Niger will repel capital investment and continue to suffer crushing poverty. 327 According to the legal reformers, this process of burnishing and updating Niger's law should create no abrupt change in Nigeriens' lives because the country's legal system has been based on Western law, specifically the French variety, since independence.
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The picture looks very different from the viewpoint of most Nigeriens. They find Western state law unappealing and of limited utility not only because it is incomprehensible, inconveniently remote, expensive, slow, and corrupt, but also because it asks the wrong questions and produces the wrong results. 329 In the realm of petty theft, for example, most Nigeriens would wonder how the state system could possibly be confident in identifying the wrongdoer without consulting the spiritual realm. 330 Once the guilty party is identified, state law again moves in the wrong direction for Nigeriens. Traditional law demands that the wrongdoer be situated within his extended family group, and that the group have a chance to restore and defend its honor by negotiating a modus vivendi with the rest of the community, including the family of the victim. 331 Focusing the legal inquiry solely on the wrongdoer, and the legal remedy only on the victim, as the state system does, completely misses the point of restoring harmony to the larger social unit. Finally, the idea of punishing the wrongdoer by carting him off to jail is viewed by most Nigeriens as absurd. 332 Removing a person from the community and imprisoning him serves only to injure his family, including his ancestors and his descendants, making a permanent tear in the social fabric. 333 Given that the gon and similar legal rites play a central role in Niger's most commonly subscribed system of justice, that they are widely accepted as legitimate and infallible, speedy, perfectly consistent with most peoples' cultural beliefs and practices, and are efficacious as a tool for restoring community harmony, does it make sense to permit Washington Consensus legal reformers to abruptly eliminate it? That question will briefly be explored in the concluding section.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has cast doubt on the wisdom of abruptly displacing the Nigerien legal traditions by means of Washington Legal Consensus reform. But that does not mean that all attempts to change Niger's law are misguided or that the West can play no useful role in facilitating the development of Niger's legal system.
The law is not static. As time passes, the law that Nigeriens live by will change regardless of whether that change is being pushed by Western legal reformers. 334 The gon itself illustrates the evolving nature of law, for although this Article refers to it as "traditional law," it probably was not widely practiced, at least not in its present form, until the twentieth century, when Nigerien society began to embrace Islam. 335 Undoubtedly, such natural change in the law will continue, even in the absence of Washington Consensus pressure. For example, if Niger were to increase its rate of literacy and its connections to the global economy, reliance on magio-religious legal practices, such as the gon, would naturally fade and more secular and rational legal practices would take root.
If Niger's law is bound to change over time, there is nothing wrong and much right with encouraging movement toward transparency, consistency, predictability, and dedication to human rights. Recent history indicates that such qualities tend to engender long-term political stability. 336 Furthermore, the World Bank and the IMF may have it correct that stable, rational, Western-style laws eventually will spur long-term economic development in Niger, even though past experience and present economic indicators provide ample grounds for skepticism. 337. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (expressing doubt about prospects for economic development). descendants of slaves, and ethnic minorities-could find their status significantly elevated.
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This Article's conclusion, therefore, is not that the Nigerien state should eschew legal reform and leave the resolution of all legal disputes to oracles and the traditional leaders who control them. Rather, it is that Nigerien law reformers and their Western sponsors have gone about reform in an unwise fashion. They should pay closer attention to the legal traditions they are displacing, and they should find a way to legitimate the new by affecting a gradual transition.
Before outlining a few concrete suggestions for more effective law reform in Niger, I offer some predictions regarding what will happen if the government and its Western sponsors continue down their present Washington Legal Consensus path. One possibility is that the Nigerien government will continue to promulgate Western style laws but fail to follow through with aggressive steps to end its citizens' reliance on practices such as the gon. If this happens, the Consensus reforms will be no more than words on paper, much like the French law that nominally has ruled the country since independence. Such a course will accomplish none of its putative goals of creating an attractive environment for capital investment or establishing due process and individual rights, since most people-particularly the uneducated majority living outside of large cities-will simply continue to ignore the state law. Assuming that law reform and modernization is a desirable outcome, then this course will be harmful because it will reinforce the social and cultural gulf that separate the state of Niger and its laws from most of its citizens.
Another possibility is that Niger will execute its stated plans to aggressively suppress practices such as the gon, as many in the government and the evolue leadership class believe it should. The consequences of this path, however, will be at least as destructive. Communities, particularly rural ones, that exist today under conditions of extreme privation will suffer most. At present, these communities are held together as functioning, sustaining, cooperative social units by means of the gon and other interconnected historical, social, spiritual, and legal traditions.
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I f th e se tr a d itio n s a r e su p p r e sse d , th e Wa sh in g to n L e g a l Consensus will fail to fill the resulting void, at least in the short and medium term. As discussed in Part IV.D.2, the Consensus will fail for the practical reason that resources do not, and likely will not at any time in the foreseeable future, exist to implement Consensus law outside of cities. 340 More fundamentally, it will fail because Nigerien people, even if they could gain access to Western law, would not be willing to rely on it because it is premised on fundamentally foreign and distasteful notions about the nature of law and justice. In sum, I predict that eliminating traditional law in Niger will create a void into which social unrest, rather than Western law, will creep.
For those who wish to encourage Niger to develop a predictable and consistent state legal system but who do not wish to eliminate overnight the traditions that underpin the country's social cohesion, there is another way. It is possible for reformers to gradually create a template for a modern, Western-style legal system, while simultaneously preserving the legal traditions that have succeeded for the majority of Niger's contemporary citizens. With this approach, if Niger develops natural or human resources that permit an entrée into the world of global trade, and if, as a result of such economic development, Niger's citizens and their partners from the West require access to rational, predictable legal structures, they can rely upon the state legal system. Likewise, if increased literacy and general education lead to an awareness among Niger's people of human rights protections for women and other traditionally disenfranchised groups, then they too can turn toward state law as a means of claiming their individual rights and privileges. In short, legal reformers should establish the template of a modern legal system, while having the patience to let that system compete with traditional law for the allegiance of Niger's people.
This gradual, dualistic, competitive approach to legal reform can be effectuated if Washington Consensus reformers will first admit that it is not possible to draft and debate major pieces of legislation meaningfully in a matter of weeks or even months, particularly where the legislation represents a radical departure from existing legal traditions.
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A s i m p o r t a n t , r e f o r m e r s s h o u l d propose that Niger's National Assembly consider legislation to permit state courts to take cognizance of traditional evidence, such as gon evidence, in cases where the stakes are relatively low-such as misdemeanor theft cases-and where the accused and the victim agree to be bound by tradition.
This effort to create continuity between old and new could also be supplemented by a written guide to traditional evidence and the resolution of criminal matters. Assuming a description of traditional procedures and practices could be agreed upon, the written collection could act as a sort of grande coutume to guide state judges in cases where application of traditional law was appropriate.
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N i g e r ' s l e g a l r e f o r m e r s c o u l d a l s o g o a l o n g w a y t o w a r d legitimating their newly passed criminal laws by revisiting their very Western conception of punishment and honoring the country's traditional emphasis on restorative justice. As a concrete example, the law could delineate circumstances under which persons identified as wrongdoers would be reinserted into their families and communities, rather than punished by removal and imprisonment. Whatever course Nigerien reformers and their sponsors pursue, they should not continue to do what they have done thus far. They should not assume that they can impose an utterly foreign law on top of an engrained indigenous legal tradition and expect people to pay heed to the transplant. They should understand that they cannot craft appropriate legislation without carefully studying the unwritten law that already exists. Unless Nigerien legal reformers understand and account for indigenous legal practices such as the gon, and unless they identify ways to link the newly reformed laws to existing traditions, they will damage the traditions that serve as the foundations of justice and peace in their society, while rendering it unlikely that their reformed laws will ever be accepted as legitimate.
consistent "grande coutume").
